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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Ronald R. Yeskey is a Pennsylvania prison inmate who 
was denied admission to the Pennsylvania Department of 
Correction's Motivational Boot Camp program because of a 
history of hypertension, despite the recommendation of the 
sentencing judge that he be placed therein.1 Yeskey brought 
suit in the district court under the Americans With 
Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., alleging 
that his exclusion from the program violated that enactment.2 
 
The district court dismissed Yeskey's complaint, Fed. R. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Motivational Boot Camp Act, 61 P.S. §1121 et seq., established a 
"motivational boot camp" to which certain inmates may be assigned by 
the Department of Corrections to serve their sentences for a period of six 
months. The boot camp provides rigorous physical activity, intensive 
regimentation and discipline, work on public projects, and other 
treatment. Id. §1123. Pursuant to statute, placement of inmates in the 
boot camp is discretionary, and, as such, no inmate has a right to such 
placement. Id. §1126(d). Upon successful completion of the six months 
incarceration, the inmate is released on parole for intensive supervision 
as determined by the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole. Id. 
§1127. 
 
2. Yeskey also asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. 
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Civ. P. 12(b)(6), holding that the ADA is inapplicable to 
state prisons. The question of the applicability of the ADA 
to prisons is an important one, especially in view of the 
increased number of inmates, including many older, 
hearing-impaired, and HIV-positive inmates, in the nation's 
jails. See generally Ira P. Robbins, George Bush's America 
Meets Dante's Inferno: The Americans with Disabilities Act in 
Prison, 15 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 49, 56-63 (1996). For the 




Because this appeal turns on statutory construction, we 
begin with the text of the relevant statute, or more 
precisely, statutes. Although Yeskey only invoked the ADA, 
our discussion necessarily involves Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Section 504, the first 
federal statute to provide broad prohibitions against 
discrimination on the basis of disability, applies only to 
programs and activities receiving federal financial 
assistance. Title II of the ADA, the broader statute, enacted 
in 1990, extends these protections and prohibitions to all 
state and local government programs and activities, 
regardless of whether they receive federal financial 
assistance. Congress has directed that Title II of the ADA be 
interpreted in a manner consistent with Section 504, 42 
U.S.C. § 12134(b), 12201(a),4 and all the leading cases take 
up the statutes together, as will we. 
 
The substantive provisions of the statutes are similar. 
Section 504 provides in pertinent part: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. By the time this case was listed for submission in this Court, only a 
short time remained on Yeskey's sentence, and we have unfortunately 
been unable to dispose of it until now. He may have been released (the 
parties have not informed us on this point). However, Yeskey's complaint 
included a claim for damages, and hence the case is not moot. We also 
note that, since boot camp placement commences contemporaneous with 
the execution of sentence, it would probably be nigh impossible to test 
improper exclusion from the boot camp program in federal court before 
the six month placement expires, likely creating a situation capable of 
repetition yet evading review, which excuses mootness. 
 
4. See generally Robbins, supra, at 73-76. 
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 No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in 
the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or 
his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance or under any program or 
activity conducted by any Executive agency[.] 
 
29 U.S.C. § 794(a). 
 
Title II of the ADA provides in pertinent part: 
 
no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason 
of such disability, be excluded from participation in or 
be denied the benefits of the Services, programs, or 
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to 
discrimination by any such entity. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 12132. 
 
The statutory definition of "[p]rogram or activity" in 
Section 504 indicates that the terms were intended to be 
all-encompassing. They include "all of the operations of -- 
(1)(A) a department, agency, special purpose district, or 
other instrumentality of a State or of a local government 
. . . any part of which is extended Federal financial 
assistance." 29 U.S.C. §794(b) (emphasis added). It is hard 
to imagine how state correctional programs would not fall 
within this broad definition. 
 
Moreover, a word in a statute "must be given its `ordinary 
or natural' meaning," see Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 
501, 506 (1995), and the ordinary meanings of "activity" 
and "program" clearly encompass those that take place in 
prisons. "Activity" means, inter alia, "natural or normal 
function or operation," and includes the "duties or 
function" of "an organizational unit for performing a specific 
function." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 22 
(1986). "Program" is defined as "a plan of procedure: a 
schedule or system under which action may be taken 
toward a desired goal." Id. at 1812. Certainly, operating a 
prison facility falls within the "duties or functions" of local 
government authorities. Moreover, Title II's definition of a 
"public entity" clearly encompasses a state or local 
correctional facility or authority: "any department, agency, 
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. . . or other instrumentality of a State or States or local 
government[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(B) (emphasis added). 
 
This conclusion is bolstered by the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) regulations implementing both Section 504 and Title 
II of the ADA. These regulations were expressly authorized 
by Congress, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12134(a), 
12206, and, in view of Congress' delegation, the DOJ's 
regulations should be accorded "controlling weight unless 
[they are] `arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to 
the statute,' " Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of 
Communities for a Great Oregon, 115 S. Ct. 2407, 2418 
(1995). The same is true of the preamble or commentary 
accompanying the regulations since both are part of the 
DOJ's official interpretation of the legislation. Thomas 
Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 114 S. Ct. 2381, 2386 (1994). 
DOJ interprets both Section 504 and Title II of the ADA to 
apply to correctional facilities. 
 
The regulations promulgated by DOJ to enforce Section 
504 define the kinds of programs and benefits that should 
be afforded to individuals with disabilities on a 
nondiscriminatory basis. The regulations define "program" 
to mean "the operations of the agency or organizational unit 
of government receiving or substantially benefiting from the 
Federal assistance awarded, e.g., a police department or 
department of corrections." 28 C.F.R. § 42.540(h) (1996) 
(emphasis added). The term "[b]enefit" includes "provision 
of services, financial aid or disposition (i.e., treatment, 
handling, decision, sentencing, confinement, or other 
prescription of conduct)." Id. § 42.540(j) (emphasis added). 
The appendix to the regulations, attached to the Final Rule 
(45 Fed. Reg. 37620, 37630 (1980)), makes clear that 
services and programs provided by detention and 
correctional agencies and facilities are covered by Section 
504. This coverage is broad, and includes "jails, prisons, 
reformatories and training schools, work camps, reception 
and diagnostic centers, pre-release and work release 
facilities, and community-based facilities." Id. 
 
The appendix further provides that those facilities 
designated for use by persons with disabilities are "required 
to make structural modifications to accommodate detainees 
or prisoners in wheelchairs." Id. The DOJ regulations 
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applicable to federally conducted programs also make it 
clear that institutions administered by the Federal Bureau 
of Prisons are subject to Section 504. See 28 C.F.R. 
§ 39.170(d)(1)(ii) (Section 504 complaint procedure for 
inmates of federal penal institutions); id. pt. 39, Editorial 
Note, at 675 (Section 504 regulations requiring 
nondiscrimination in programs or activities of the 
Department of Justice apply to the Federal Bureau of 
Prisons); id. at 676 (federally conducted program is 
"anything a Federal agency does"). 
 
The regulations promulgated under Title II of the ADA 
afford similar protections to persons with disabilities who 
are incarcerated in prisons, or otherwise institutionalized 
by the state or its instrumentalities, regardless of the public 
institution's receipt of federal financial assistance. The 
regulations state that the statute's coverage extends to "all 
services, programs, and activities provided or made 
available by public entities." Id. § 35.102(a). This broad 
language is intended to "appl[y] to anything a public entity 
does." Id. pt. 35, app. A, subpt. A at 456. As part of its 
regulatory obligations under Title II, the DOJ is designated 
as the agency responsible for coordinating the compliance 
activities of public entities that administer "[a]ll programs, 
services, and regulatory activities relating to law 
enforcement, public safety, and the administration of 
justice, including courts and correctional institutions." Id. 
§ 35.190(b)(6). The preamble to the ADA regulations also 
refers explicitly to prisons, stating that, where an individual 
with disabilities "is an inmate of a custodial or correctional 
institution," the entity is required to provide"assistance in 
toileting, eating, or dressing to [that] individual[ ]." Id. pt. 
35, app. A at 468.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Moreover, the DOJ Title II Technical Assistance Manual specifically 
lists "jails and prisons" as types of facilities that, if constructed or 
altered after the effective date of the ADA (January 26, 1992), must be 
designed and constructed so that they are readily accessible to and 
usable by individuals with disabilities. Title II Technical Assistance 
Manual II-6.0000, II-6.3300(6). The design standards applicable to 
facilities covered by Section 504 and Title II also include specific 
provisions relating to correctional facilities. The DOJ Section 504 
regulations adopt the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards (UFAS), 
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In sum, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Title II of 
the ADA, and the specific provisions in the DOJ's 
regulations listing correctional facilities or departments as 
covered entities confirm that the Rehabilitation Act and the 





The weight of judicial authority also supports our 
conclusion that the ADA applies to prison programs. In 
Crawford v. Indiana Department of Corrections, ___ F.3d ___, 
1997 WL 289101 (7th Cir. June 2, 1997), the Seventh 
Circuit held that Title II of the ADA applied to state prisons 
in the case of a blind, former state prisoner who sought 
damages resulting from his exclusion from a variety of 
programs, activities, and facilities at the prison that were 
routinely available to the prison's population, including 
educational programs, the library, and the dining hall. 
Accord Duffy v. Riveland, 98 F.3d 447, 455 (9th Cir. 1996); 
Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1522 n.41 (11th Cir. 
1991) (holding Rehabilitation Act applicable). 
 
Two circuits have questioned the applicability of Section 
704 and Title II to prisons. See Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 
1340, 1344-46 (4th Cir. 1995) (coverage of prisons by 
Section 504 and Title II not clearly established in qualified 
immunity context), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 772 (1996); 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
which apply to federal agencies and entities receiving federal financial 
assistance. 28 C.F.R. § 42.522(b). UFAS lists"jails, prisons, 
reformatories" and "[o]ther detention or correctional facilities" as 
institutions to which the accessibility standards apply. 41 C.F.R. subpt. 
101-19.6, app. A at 150. Under Title II, covered entities building new or 
altering existing facilities may follow either UFAS or the ADA 
Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities (ADAAG). 28 C.F.R. 
§ 35.151(c); see id. pt. 36, app. A. Amendments to the ADAAG, adopted 
as an Interim Final Rule, effective December 20, 1994, by the 
Architectural & Transportation Barriers Compliance Board, include 
specific accessibility guidelines for "detention and correctional facilities." 
59 Fed. Reg. 31676, 31770-72 (1994). The Department of Justice has 
proposed adoption of the interim final rule. Id. at 31808. The ADAAG is 
not effective until adopted by the DOJ. 
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White v. State of Colorado, 82 F.3d 364, 367 (10th Cir. 
1996) (neither ADA nor Rehabilitation Act applies to prison 
employment). In our view, these opinions are seriously 
flawed. The leading case in support of the Commonwealth's 
position is Torcasio, which was followed by the district 
court here, and so we focus our sights on that case.6 
 
The Fourth Circuit in Torcasio acknowledged that the 
broad language prohibiting discrimination on the basis of 
disability in both statutes "appears all-encompassing," 57 
F.3d at 1344. Nevertheless, the Torcasio court was 
reluctant to find either statute applicable to prisons 
because of the so-called "clear statement" doctrine, as set 
out in Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 
58, 65 (1989): 
 
if Congress intends to alter the "usual constitutional 
balance between the States and the Federal 
Government," it must make its intention to do so 
"unmistakably clear in the language of the statute." 
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 
242 . . . (1985); see also, Pennhurst State School and 
Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 . . . (1984). 
 
Because it found the operation of prisons to be a "core state 
function," 57 F.3d at 1345, and because neither Section 
504 nor Title II includes an express statement of its 
application to correctional facilities, the Torcasio court 
expressed its doubt that Congress had "clearly" intended 
either statute to apply to state prisons. Id. at 1346. 
 
This extension of the clear statement rule was 
unwarranted. Will, Atascadero, and Pennhurst all involved 
instances in which there had been no express waiver or 
abrogation of the state's traditional immunity from suit, 
either by the state itself (Pennhurst), or by Congress (Will, 
Atascadero). Here, in contrast, both Section 504 and Title 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Torcasio did not decide whether either Section 504 or Title II of the 
ADA applies to prisons; rather, it concluded that such coverage was not 
clearly established at the time of the events at issue, and that the 
individual defendants in that case therefore were entitled to qualified 
immunity. In reaching its qualified immunity ruling, however, the 
Torcasio court discussed the reach of the two statutes at length, and 
expressed its doubt that either applied to prisons. 
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II of the ADA contain an "unequivocal expression of 
congressional intent to overturn the constitutionally 
guaranteed immunity of the several states." Pennhurst, 465 
U.S. at 99 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); 
see 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) ("A State shall not be immune 
under the Eleventh Amendment . . . from suit in Federal 
court for a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act."); id. § 12202 ("A State shall not be immune under the 
eleventh amendment . . . from an action in Federal or State 
court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of[the 
ADA]."). 
 
To be sure, when "Congress intends to alter the usual 
constitutional balance between the States and the Federal 
Government, it must make its intention to do so 
unmistakably clear in the language of the statute." Gregory 
v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460, 461 (1991) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). This requirement, 
however, is a "rule of statutory construction to be applied 
where statutory intent is ambiguous." Id. at 470. It is not 
a warrant to disregard clearly expressed congressional 
intent. 
 
Torcasio's statement that Congress must specifically 
identify state or local prisons in the statutory text, if it 
wishes to regulate them, was expressly disavowed by the 
Supreme Court in Gregory. See id. at 467 ("This does not 
mean that the Act must mention judges explicitly."). 
Congress need only make the scope of a statute "plain." Id. 
And Congress has done that here. Both Section 504 and 
Title II speak unambiguously of their application to state 
and local governments and to "any" or "all" of their 
operations. In light of the clear and all-encompassing 
language of both statutes, there is no basis for requiring 
Congress to have detailed which of the many important 
components of state and local governments were to be 
included in the terms "any" and "all." 
 
In Crawford, supra, just as in this case, the state relied 
on the fact that prison administration was a "core" state 
function in arguing that the clear statement rule was 
triggered. Judge Posner responded most forcefully: 
 
Prison administration is indeed a core function of state 
government, as is education. But the state's concession 
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that the Americans with Disabilities Act applies to the 
prison's relations with its employees and visitors, as 
well as to the public schools, suggests that the clear- 
statement rule does not carry this particular core 
function of state government outside the scope of the 
Act. We doubt, moreover, that Congress could speak 
much more clearly than it did when it made the Act 
expressly applicable to all public entities and defined 
the term "public entity" to include every possible 
agency of state or local government. Maybe there is an 
inner core of sovereign functions, such as the balance 
of power between governor and state legislature, that if 
somehow imperiled by the ADA would be protected by 
the clear-statement rule, cf. Gregory v. Ashcroft, supra, 
501 U.S. at 461-63; but the mere provision of public 
services, such as schools and prisons, is not within 
that inner core. 
 




Despite the Commonwealth's contention to the contrary, 
moreover, prisoners (in contrast to prisons) are not excluded 
from coverage because Section 504 and Title II protect only 
"qualified individual[s] with a disability." That term is 
defined in Title II to mean: 
 
an individual with a disability who, with or without 
reasonable modifications . . . meets the essential 
eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the 
participation in programs or activities provided by a 
public entity. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). The terms "eligibility" and 
"participation" do not, as Torcasio stated, see 57 F.3d at 
1347, "imply voluntariness" or mandate that an individual 
seek out or request a service to be covered. To the contrary, 
the term "eligibility" simply describes those who are "fitted 
or qualified to be chosen," without regard to their own 
wishes. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 
supra at 736. 
 
Judge Posner addressed a related aspect of the case quite 
incisively: 
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It might seem absurd to apply the Americans with 
Disabilities Act to prisoners. Prisoners are not a 
favored group in society; the propensity of some of 
them to sue at the drop of a hat is well known; prison 
systems are strapped for funds; the practical effect of 
granting disabled prisoners rights of access that might 
require costly modifications of prison facilities might be 
the curtailment of educational, recreational, and 
rehabilitative programs for prisoners, in which event 
everyone might be worse off. But . . . there is another 
side to the issue. The Americans with Disabilities Act 
was cast in terms not of subsidizing an interest group 
but of eliminating a form of discrimination that 
Congress considered unfair and even odious. The Act 
assimilates the disabled to groups that by reason of 
sex, age, race, religion, nationality, or ethnic origin are 
believed to be victims of discrimination. Rights against 
discrimination are among the few rights that prisoners 
do not park at the prison gates. Although the special 
conditions of the prison setting license a degree of 
discrimination that would not be tolerated in a free 
environment, there is no general right of prison officials 
to discriminate against prisoners on grounds of race, 
sex, religion, and so forth. If a prison may not exclude 
blacks from the prison dining hall and force them to 
eat in their cells, and if Congress thinks that 
discriminating against a blind person is like 
discriminating against a black person, it is not obvious 
that the prison may exclude the blind person from the 
dining hall, unless allowing him to use the dining hall 
would place an undue burden on prison management. 
 
Crawford, __ F.3d __, 1997 WL 289101, at *5 (citations 
omitted). We agree here as well. 
 
In sum, in enacting the ADA, Congress "invoke[d] the 
sweep of [its] authority, including the power to enforce the 
fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order 
to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to- 
day by people with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4). 
The "critical areas" in which "discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities persists" were set forth in the 
statute, and include "institutionalization." Id. § 12101(a)(3). 
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Thus, if the plain words of a statute are to guide the courts 
in interpreting it, then both statutes must be held to apply 
to state and local correctional facilities.7 Essentially, the 
Commonwealth is asking us to amend the statute, 




The foregoing discussion establishes that the ADA applies 
to Yeskey's claim. His claim for injunctive relief is, 
apparently, moot in view of the impending (or actual) 
completion of his prison term. His claim for damages will 
turn, presumably, on whether he should (or would) have 
been admitted to the boot camp. Even with the ADA 
applicable, Yeskey might not have been admitted for a 
number of reasons, which will have to be explored on 
remand. 
 
The Commonwealth has invoked the specter of federal 
court management of state prisons: 
 
 Application of the ADA to internal prison 
management would place nearly every aspect of prison 
management into the court's hands for scrutiny simply 
because an inmate has a disability. See Pierce v. King, 
918 F. Supp. 932, 941 (E.D.N.C. 1996). For instance, 
if the ADA applies to routine prison decisions, it is not 
unfathomable that courts will be used to reconstruct 
cells and prison space, to alter scheduling of inmate 
movements and assignments and to interfere with 
security procedures. 
 
Brief at 15. Although these considerations do not override 
our conclusion that the ADA applies to prisons, our holding 
does not dispose of the controversial and difficult question 
whether principles of deference to the decisions of prison 
officials in the context of constitutional law apply to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We add that the legislative history does not inveigh against this 
conclusion. When the ADA was enacted in 1990, the Rehabilitation Act 
had been law for seventeen years and a number of cases had held it 
applicable to prisons and prisoners, yet Congress did not amend that Act 
or alter any language so as to extirpate those interpretations. 
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statutory rights. See generally Robbins, supra, at 94-97.8 
We are not sure of the answer, and need not address that 
question now for, at all events, we doubt that it will be 
germane in this case. We do, however, "flag" it for another 
day. 
 
The judgment of the district court will be reversed, and 
the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), establishes a four-part 
"reasonableness" test for judicial deference to prison managment 
decisions in the face of constitutional challenges (usually under the 
Eighth Amendment). The first requirement is "a valid rational 
connection" between the regulation and the alleged governmental 
interest. The second inquiry is whether alternative means exist for 
inmates to exercise the right under consideration. The third issue is the 
effect that accommodation of the asserted right will have on security, 
administrative efficiency, prison staff, and the larger inmate population. 
The final prong of the test is whether an alternative means exists for 
prison officials to accomplish their objectives without infringing on 
inmates' rights. See also O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 
(1987) (reaffirmed the Turner standard with respect to alleged 
infringement of inmates' First Amendment right to free exercise of 
religion). 
 
The Ninth Circuit has held that the Turner standard applies to 
statutory rights such as those created by the ADA. In Gates v. Rowland, 
39 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir. 1994), the court reversed a lower court's ruling 
that denial of food-service positions to HIV-positive inmates 
discriminated against them impermissibly. Reasoning that, where 
constitutional protections bend, statutory privileges must too, the court 
deferred to the penalogical concerns asserted by prison officials. The 
Eighth Circuit disagrees. See Pargo v. Elliott , 49 F.3d 1355 (8th Cir. 
1995)(Turner does not foreclose all heightened judicial review.) 
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